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Abstract 
In what follows various econometric technique is applied to determine the source of consumption 
growth with historical retrospective to equity and real estate markets as well comparative analysis 
of US consumer and Chinese consumer is presented. 
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Developed market perspective 
Equity boom in the US that started in mid 1990s has been driving consumer wealth and consumer 
credit (CC1) with it up to the early 2000 when deregulation in the financial sector coupled with 
development of sophisticated financial products allowed to securitize illiquid assets, increasing 
wealth of consumer via raise in the price of previously illiquid assets like real estate (Chart 1). 
Laibson, Mollerstrom (2010) have argued that asset price movements, including the equity 
markets and residential real estate markets are capable of explaining international financial flows 
(i.e. private debt buildup). During the period of inflated asset values, US consumers spent their 
new wealth, with marginal propensity to consume of about 4%. The asset bubble framework 
quantitatively explains the large current account deficit of the US. 
 
Chart1. S&P Index (orange line), Household Wealth (net worth, 
white line) and House Prices (S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index, 
yellow line). 1990-2010 
 
Data source: Bloomberg 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 The total outstanding consumer credit amount. This index is taken from the G.19 report disseminated by the Federal Reserve. Covers 
most short and intermediate term credit extended to individuals, excluding loans secured by real estate.  
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Chart 2. Consumer Debt/Disposable Income ratio, 1970-2009. 
 
Data source: Bloomberg 
 
Chart 2 shows that consumer credit started to decouple from disposable income in mid 1990s when 
equity market rate of growth has increased. To account for possible structural change in the rate of 
growth in equity market the dummy regression model is applied. Results in Table 1 confirm that 
there has been indeed a significant change in the pre and post 1995 equity price growth rates.  
Table1 
The following model is proposed: lnS&Pt=α1+ α2Dt+β1t+ β2(Dt*tt)+µt; Regressand is the 
logarithm of Y and the regressor is “time,” which will take values of 1, 2,3, etc. Dummy 
Takes the value of 0 for older subperiod and 1 for latter subperiod. Subperiods 1990-
1995 and 1995-2000, monthly data. Data adjusted for autocorrelation via Newey-West 
HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=5). Data source: Bloomberg. 
Dependent Variable: LOGSPX   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 120    
Included observations: 120   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 5.801010 0.012463 465.4716 0.0000 
TIME 0.006728 0.000355 18.93505 0.0000 
DUM -0.740617 0.035032 -21.14095 0.0000 
DUM*TIME 0.011980 0.000503 23.84056 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.989077    Mean dependent var 6.379853 
Adjusted R-squared 0.988795    S.D. dependent var 0.450291 
S.E. of regression 0.047666    Akaike info criterion -3.216452 
Sum squared resid 0.263552    Schwarz criterion -3.123535 
Log likelihood 196.9871    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.178718 
F-statistic 3501.338    Durbin-Watson stat 0.635720 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Results show that both diffferencial intercept and slope coefficients are statistically significant, 
strongly suggesting that the growth rate of S&P Index for two sample periods differ. Since equity 
income is part of consumer wealth (household worth, as in Federal Reserve form B.100 Flow of 
Funds release) it comes at no surprise that surge in wealth is caused by S&P index trend change. 
We test for the structural shift in consumer credit with benchmark year 19952. Results presented 
in Table 2 in reconfirm for structural change in 1995.  
Table 2 
The following model is proposed: CCt=α1+ α2Dt+β1t+ β2(Dt*tt)+µt; Regressand is the Y 
and the regressor is “time,” which will take values of 1, 2,3, etc. Dummy Takes the 
value of 0 for older subperiod and 1 for latter subperiod. Subperiods 1990-1995 and 
1995-2000, monthly data. Data adjusted for autocorrelation via Newey-West HAC 
Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=5). 
Dependent Variable: COONSUMER CREDIT (CC)   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 433    
Included observations: 433   
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=5) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 88.50460 12.53731 7.059300 0.0000 
DUM -1663.761 36.39433 -45.71485 0.0000 
TIME 3.159235 0.078704 40.14095 0.0000 
DUM*TIME 6.595812 0.122910 53.66359 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.997360    Mean dependent var 1023.139 
Adjusted R-squared 0.997341    S.D. dependent var 736.4816 
S.E. of regression 37.97496    Akaike info criterion 10.12093 
Sum squared resid 618659.9    Schwarz criterion 10.15853 
Log likelihood -2187.180    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.13577 
F-statistic 54018.62    Durbin-Watson stat 0.021154 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
The 2nd benchmark candidate for structural change is expected to be year 20003, when Glass–
Steagall act has been repealed. Initial assumption has been related to consumption financed with 
debt or bank debt (which is the asset side of the banking sector). In order to account for possible 
                                                          
2 It is possible that change in legislation might have caused decoupling of credit aggregates. In particular, the 1995 New Community 
Reinvestment Act, which strengthened the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in mortgage markets and facilitated mortgage 
securitization. 
3 There have been legislation change in 1999 – Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which removed the prohibition that prevented bank holding 
companies from owning other financial companies and 2000 Commodity Futures Modernization Act, which stipulated that financial 
derivatives such as CDOs would not be regulated as futures contracts, securities. 
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policy shift after the Glass–Steagall act has been repealed at the end of 19994 the analogue of the 
Chow test5 via dummy variables is employed. Results are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 
The following model is proposed: BAt=α1+ α2Dt+β1GDP+ β2(Dt*GDPt)+µt; Regressand is 
the Y and the regressor is “time,” which will take values of 1, 2,3, etc. Dummy Takes 
the value of 0 for older subperiod and 1 for latter subperiod. Subperiods 1973-2000 and 
2000-2008, quarterly data. Data adjusted for autocorrelation via Newey-West HAC 
Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=5).Data source: Federal Reserve’s 
weekly H.8 report. 
Dependent Variable: Bank Assets (BA)   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 409    
Included observations: 409   
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=5) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -70.17130 19.85841 -3.533580 0.0005 
GDP 0.572823 0.005232 109.4861 0.0000 
GPD*D 0.459075 0.023322 19.68449 0.0000 
DUM -4208.013 250.7430 -16.78218 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.998569    Mean dependent var 3862.697 
Adjusted R-squared 0.998559    S.D. dependent var 2545.807 
S.E. of regression 96.65542    Akaike info criterion 11.98991 
Sum squared resid 3783619.    Schwarz criterion 12.02917 
Log likelihood -2447.937    Hannan-Quinn criter. 12.00544 
F-statistic 94214.03    Durbin-Watson stat 0.363090 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
As these regression results show, both the differential intercept and slope coefficients are 
statistically significant, strongly suggesting that the BANK ASSETS-GDP regressions for the two 
time periods are different. The same applies to BANK-ASSET-DISPOSABLE INCOME or BANK 
ASSETS-CONSUMER CREDIT relationships (regression results not presented here). We, 
therefore, conclude that banking sector has decoupled from the economy, whether measured 
relative to disposable income, GDP or consumption. This decoupling, however did not bring any 
surge in disposable income as presented in Table 4.  
 
                                                          
4
 The repeal enabled commercial lenders such as Citigroup, which was in 1999 the largest U.S. bank by assets, to underwrite and trade 
instruments such as mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations and establish so-called structured investment 
vehicles, or SIVs, that bought those securities. It was originally introduced in order to separate bank types according to their business 
(commercial and investment banking) in 1933 to exclude the possibility of commercial banks being too exposed to risky assets.  
5 Gregory C. Chow, “Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions,” Econometrica, vol. 28, no. 3, 1960, pp. 
591–605. 
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Table 4 
The following model is proposed: lnLOGDIt=α1+ α2Dt+β1t+µt; Regressand is the 
logarithm of Y and the regressor is “time,” which will take values of 1, 2,3, etc. Dummy 
Takes the value of 0 for older subperiod and 1 for latter subperiod. Subperiods 1973-
2000 and 2000-2008, annual data. Data adjusted for autocorrelation via Newey-West 
HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=5). Data source: Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Dependent Variable: logarithm of Disposable income 
(LOGDI)   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 36    
Included observations: 36   
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 7.014048 0.073117 95.92854 0.0000 
DUM -0.211163 0.082883 -2.547738 0.0157 
TIME 0.072023 0.004164 17.29846 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.987015    Mean dependent var 8.293680 
Adjusted R-squared 0.986228    S.D. dependent var 0.696489 
S.E. of regression 0.081735    Akaike info criterion -2.091010 
Sum squared resid 0.220461    Schwarz criterion -1.959050 
Log likelihood 40.63817    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.044952 
F-statistic 1254.216    Durbin-Watson stat 0.293114 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Disposable income (DI) has actually been growing more slowly in 2000-2008 period than in 1973-
2000 period. Consequently, bank asset growth has not coincided with surge in disposable income 
but has coincided with surge in consumer credit. This has led to 2nd round of CC decoupling from 
DI. It seems that it is stock markets that have been driving consumer wealth in mid 1990s that 
have affected consumption pattern. After 2000 housing was increasing wealth and drove 
consumption higher.  CC/Wealth is the only variable that remained stationary, i.e. mean reverting, 
for the period 1973-2008 as shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
 
Null Hypothesis: CC/Wealth ratio has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 9 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=17) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.574630  0.0067 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.445701  
 5% level  -2.868202  
 10% level  -2.570384  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 420 after adjustments  
     
     
     
 
These results are consistent with findings of Barrell and Davis 2007 who found that removal of 
liquidity constraints  during liberalization may reduce the response of consumption to real 
personal income, and what is most important, may boost wealth effect correspondingly6. By 
employing various econometric technique, they test the relationship between consumption, income 
and aggregate real net wealth in the long term that is augmented by a split between changes in 
tangible wealth and financial wealth in the short term. What they find is that when financial 
liberalization takes place, the coefficient on human wealth (i.e. income) may be reduced, as scope 
for borrowing means consumption is less closely tied to current income. Furthermore, the weights 
on financial and non financial nonhuman wealth could change with liberalization. When 
households are constrained in their borrowing, direct liquidity of the components of wealth will be 
crucial for their effect on consumption. A lower weight would be anticipated for less liquid assets 
and especially for tangible wealth. When there are no credit constraints, as in a liberalized 
financial system, consumers can borrow to cover shortfalls in income and the ability to consume 
out of wealth, and in particular illiquid wealth. Higher wealth effects, especially in the short run 
dynamics of adjustment, are thus likely both for illiquid financial assets (equities, bonds, pension 
assets) and non financial tangible wealth. Byrne and Davis (2003) highlighted that illiquid as well 
as liquid financial wealth is likely to become important in determining consumption in the G-7, 
and indeed showed in rolling regressions that there has been a rise in the long run impact of 
                                                          
6
 Similar studies have been performed by Davis and Palumbo’s (2001) study of the US consumption function, which attempted to 
determine whether changes in wealth as well as income affect the growth rate of consumer spending. Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) 
also examined wealth effects in a quarterly loglinear long-run US consumption relationship and found a common trend and a 
statistically significant wealth and income effect (Barrell and Davis 2007) 
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illiquid financial wealth on consumption. Modelling the G-5, Barrell and Davis (2004) highlighted 
that absence of credit constraints also affects non-financial tangible wealth. The incidence of 
liquidity constraints was considered to be shown inter alia by the relative size of income and 
wealth terms in the consumption function, which was a crucial difference between their estimates 
over 1980-2001 for less liberalised countries such as Germany and Japan vis a vis France, the UK 
and US. Meanwhile, tangible wealth was generally significant in both the short and long run. 
 
Jaewoo, Rabanal and Sandri (2010) found that wealth effect was a primary factor behind the rapid 
decline in the U.S. saving rate (raise in consumption rate) in the late 1990s. They found that high-
wealth groups which benefited most from raising wealth decreased substantially their saving rate, 
while low-wealth groups changed little or even increased their saving rate.  
 
Emerging market perspective 
The Chinese government has called for rebalancing the economy towards greater reliance on 
consumption as the driver of growth, away from investment and external trade as has been in 
recent years7. Underlying this, is the striking trend of continuing decline in the share of household 
consumption in GNP, which has fallen to below 40 percent in 2005, despite the remarkable pace of 
sustained high economic growth. In explaining this declining share of consumption, studies have 
largely focused on the household savings behavior, arguing that this trend reflects the high and 
rising savings by Chinese households (Blanchard and Giavazzi (2005), Kujis (2005), Modigliani 
and Cao (2004), Prasad and Rajan (2005)), due to a range of factors such as the rise in average 
household income, the increase in the proportion of working age population, and an increase in 
precautionary savings with the rise in the uncertainties during reforms (especially that of state-
owned enterprises) and inadequate public provision of pensions, healthcare, and education. While 
there is little doubt that these factors could be important in explaining the rise in the household 
saving rate, it is less convincing that these are the main reasons for the decline in the consumption 
share. In fact, data suggests that the increase in saving alone explains only a small fraction of the 
decline in the consumption share. The rise in household saving rate of 5 percentage points since 
the early 1990s can only explain 1 percentage of the 9 percentage points decline in the share of 
consumption that has occurred since then. During the same time the share of household income in 
                                                          
7 See for example, Zhou Xiaochuan’s (Governor of the People’s Bank of China) foreword in Jahangir Aziz et. al edited, “China and India: 
Learning from Each Other,” IMF, 2006. 
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GNP declined by 8 percentage points. The decline in household income’s share occurred across all 
major sub-categories, but particularly in wages, which, unsurprisingly, is the largest component of 
income. The shares of investment income and government transfers also fell. Given that the 
decline in wage income was the largest contributory factor, it may be tempting to seek an answer 
in China’s labor market. With 100-150 million workers either unemployed or underemployed, it is 
perhaps easy to argue that this slack in the labor market has prevented wages from rising as fast 
as productivity, leading to the continued decline in the share of wage income. If one adds to that 
some degree of monopolistic power in the hands of the employers and ineffective worker protection, 
then it is even easier to see why workers have not benefited from the huge productivity gains the 
economy has enjoyed.  
 
Aziz and Cui (2007) has shown that China’s underdeveloped financial sector and persistent and 
rising difficulty for average firms to obtain financing has played a major role in explaining the co-
movements in employment, household income, and consumption over the last two decades. 
Specifically, Chinese firms rely on bank financing for working capital to pay wages and other 
current expenditure, where they are credit constrained. These borrowing constraints act like taxes 
on labor input that discourage the use of labor and create a wedge between the market wage rate 
and the marginal product of labor. Because of this wedge, the labor share in national income is less 
than its technologically determined share and the more difficult it is for firms to borrow, the larger 
is this wedge and lower is labor share. The paper showed that since the mid-1990s, pressures to 
reform forced Chinese banks to become more conservative in their lending operations to avoid 
creating new non-performing loans, which tightened borrowing constraints of firms, leading to a 
decline in the wage share. The declining share of wage income, however, would not necessarily 
have led to such a steep fall in household income share, if rising profits were distributed to 
households. This did not happen in China for several reasons. First, despite some listing in 
domestic stock markets, ownership of Chinese firms is not widely held, either directly or indirectly 
(through institutional investors and pension funds), by households. Second, even for firms that are 
listed, weak corporate governance and minority shareholding rights have allowed firms to 
accumulate profit instead of distributing dividends. A string of scandals in the past few years 
associated with poor supervision of brokerage firms led to a protracted period of depressed equity 
prices and limited transactions such that households who owned shares did not benefit from 
underlying capital gains. Third, the government still retains considerable ownership of the 
corporate sector. In most countries, this has been a conduit of indirectly transferring corporate 
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profit to households. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) pay dividends to the government, which uses 
the funds to provide goods such as education and health that are essentially private goods, and 
welfare payments. In China, SOEs do not pay dividends to the government, such that this conduit 
of profit transfer has been closed. Lastly, bank deposits are the main vehicle of savings of Chinese 
households. However, the interest rate on household deposits has been capped by the government. 
Consequently, the share of interest earnings has declined over the years. China’s banks have, of 
course, enjoyed higher interest rate margins. However, with much of the banking sector, burdened 
with high non-performing loans, under-capitalized, and under-provisioned until only last year, the 
higher interest margin has, for all practical purposes, ended up as being “transfers” from 
households to corporations. For these reasons and unlike in many other countries, the rise in 
corporate profits did not translate into higher household income in China. The comparison with 
international experience is striking. During the past decade, less than 8 percent of households’ 
disposable income came from investments (including profit, interest rate, etc). This is one of the 
lowest in the world. 
 
 
Data source: Aziz and Cui (2007) 
 
The nexus between financial sector development and growth is a long standing branch of 
economics literature. However, much of this literature, especially on the empirical front, has 
focused on the role played by financial intermediaries in mobilizing savings and some on their role 
in allocating savings. On the first role in China, earlier studies found that the banking sector did 
not contribute that much to growth through resource mobilization and allocation (see e.g., Aziz and 
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Duenwald (2002)). Instead, bank financing was largely concentrated in the more sluggish state-
owned enterprises, which could have aided growth indirectly by helping to maintain social stability 
in the economy. The low share of investment income in China brings into sharp focus the poor 
performance of the financial sector to distribute profit income from firms to households, both in the 
form of dividends and interest.   
 
China’s stock market is relatively small despite the rise of private firms and the dilution of public 
ownership through listings in the stock market and through sales to foreign investors. 
 
 
Data source: Aziz and Cui (2007) 
 
Until recently, about two thirds of the shares of the listed companies in China’s stock market were 
nontradable. The uncertainties about how the issue may be resolved have resulted in depressed 
stock prices and low market participation in recent years. The development of institutional 
investors (such as mutual funds, insurance, and pension funds) has been sluggish. In China, such 
investment funds were established in 1998. By the end of 2002, there were only 61 closed and 
open-ended investment funds, holding investment assets of less than 10 percent of tradable 
market capitalization, compared with 50 percent in the U.S.  
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Housing wealth in China 
During the late 1980s and the 1990s, households in most Chinese cities were offered the chance to 
purchase the apartments that they rented from the state, thereby untying access to housing from 
working in the state sector and giving urban residents a chance to become private homeowners. 
These reforms were enacted in at least 50 cities, potentially affecting more than 90 million people. 
Iyer, Meng and Qian (2009) find that the privatization reform caused private ownership of housing 
to increase from zero to approximately 50% of urban households. The untying of housing from 
state employment is probably the main driving force for this result, rather than the acquisition of 
private property rights. While it is not possible to test this directly, it is possible to individually 
test some of the implications of the different channels of private property rights like the 
importance of the credit channel for example. Though households in China at the time did not 
have access to credit from formal financial institutions for small businesses, private property can 
potentially be used as collateral for informal loans. 
 
Iyer, Meng and Qian (2009) present evidence that the housing privatization reform did not 
increase households ability to obtain credit, in keeping with the institutional setting in China. 
Households are not more likely to have either a housing loan or a non-housing loan following the 
enactment of housing privatization reforms. Iyer, Meng and Qian (2009) also find that the 
estimated coefficients for the effect of the reform on total household consumption and expenditure 
on housing improvements are small, negative and statistically insignificant. All of this suggests 
that the reform did not significantly increase household wealth8.  
 
Conclusion 
 Consumer credit has decoupled from disposable income in mid 1990s when equity market growth 
rates have changed. Consumer credit has also decoupled from disposable income in 2000s when 
Glass–Steagall act has been repealed, which allowed banks to be involved in investment activity in 
sophisticated financial instruments which in turn made previously illiquid assets (real estate) 
liquid, therefore raising demand on such instrument and therefore their price. Increasing 
consumption in developed markets caused by reliance of consumers on equity markets as well as 
                                                          
8 Any potential wealth effects are likely to be unimportant in the case of the privatization reforms, because households could not sell the 
newly acquired housing until the cities enacted the trading reforms.  
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ability to withdraw equity from appreciating real estate has been at the core of consumer spending 
expansion. Consumer Credit has been increasing with consumer wealth, leaving CC/W ration 
stationary.  Chinese have neither developed stock market to benefit from raising corporate profits 
via dividends nor bond market – they are limited to deposits which rates are depressed. Neither 
there is an ability to withdraw equity from housing as well as privatization did not result in 
increased wealth by the households. We conclude that disposable income by itself is not sufficient 
to fund increased consumption – neither there are any conditions for increased disposable income 
in China.  In summary, consumer as the engine of economic growth is simply non-existent in 
China to the degree that it exists in US and this phenomenon has to do with economic structure 
(financial architecture) of the economy. Credit tightening is closely associated with both rising 
uncertainty and declining wealth. And a large uncertainty appreciably reduces consumption not 
only via a lower wealth  and tighter credit, but also directly via precautionary savings and 
postponed consumption. Deleveraging cycle in the banking sector has just begun. It is unclear to 
what degree will this have an effect on consumer spending or to the wealth of the consumer 
balance sheet. However it seems that claim of change in paradigm and superiority of new 
emerging market consumer is simply not supported by any plausible argument, empirical research 
or statistical analysis.  
Exposure to relative disadvantage of EM (China) consumer can be structured via shorting The 
Global X China Consumer ETF and taking long positions in Consumer Discretionary SPDR ETF 
as well as Consumer Staples SPDR ETF. 
Chart 5.US Consumer//China Consumer Ratio. 
 
Data source: Bloomberg 
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